The practical success of induction sits uneasily with its apparent philosophical failings. How, then, should we evaluate our inductive practices? I survey the problems of induction and consider their dual roles: as fuel for global Pyrrhonian skepticism, and for identifying local avenues for due diligence. I consider how best to conceptualize our inductive practices if we are to perform such due diligence. Examining the limits of formal and material approaches in doing so, I argue for a broader unit of analysis: inductive practices. I develop a situated approach through a middle-range framework with five semi-general markers: goal, situation, procedure, evidence, and assessment. These markers guide due diligence by highlighting possible points of failure, making relevant epistemic, moral, social, and political reasons available for scrutiny. In turn, such due diligence can excavate defeasible reasons to proceed with our practices, giving Humean ``doubt, caution, and modesty'' a practical form.
We review the foundations of quantum statistical mechanics, with an eye on introducing philosophers of physics to its varied formalism and foundational results, and the new questions that arise for pre-existing philosophical ideas born out of classical statistical mechanics. New accounts of the approach to equilibrium emerge, including one driven by entanglement, while the classical Gibbsian-vs-Boltzmannian debate survives with blurrier boundaries. The problem of time's arrow finds some new proposed solutions, including new reasons for believing in a plurality of arrows, and new questions arise surrounding the limits of applicability of classical thermodynamics.
Some metaphysically hefty idea that matter is objectively distinct in kind from space-and-time is not new. Here we investigate this idea in general relativity by focusing on what it means for something to be `matter'. First, we ask: does the stress-energy tensor provide an objective standard for the matter-spacetime distinction? We highlight a form of shiftiness: whether the same system contributes stress-energy or not can depend on modelling contexts and choices. Second, we study other concepts which play various matter roles: quasi-local and global mass concepts. If these, too, are matter concepts, they undermine any objective, context-independent, spacetime-matter distinction -- the shiftiness compounds. As we'll argue, across these various matter concepts, there is no one ontological line between spacetime and matter, no one intrinsic conceptual line demarcating the boundaries of the matter concept, nor no one extrinsic conceptual line between spacetime and matter.
Thermal equilibrium is a foundational concept of classical thermodynamics. However, integrable and near-integrable quantum statistical mechanics reveal its limits: not all its classical theoretical roles can be recovered. We argue that this failure is epistemically productive. Classical thermal equilibrium can guide theory even where it no longer straightforwardly applies, by serving as a conceptual anchor for identifying analogies and disanalogies in new domains. This anchoring clarifies the assumptions under which the old concept worked and supplies physical meaning to generalized equilibria, showing how disanalogies can guide, rather than defeat, concept extension.
Under review, draft available upon request!
Many quantities central to physics are frame-dependent: one and the same object can be correctly assigned different values of the same general quantity (speed, length, momentum) in different inertial frames. Yet this feature has been largely neglected in the metaphysics of quantities, and it sits uneasily with the familiar single value principle according to which an object cannot have different values of the same quantity at the same time. We begin by isolating the physicist’s basic account of frame-variance and frame-invariance. We then argue that two natural metaphysical reconstructions of such account, including one that is briefly hinted at by philosophers of physics, fail. Finally, inspired by recent discussions in the metaphysics of shape literature (in the context of relativity), we develop two alternative metaphysical accounts of physical quantities that successfully recover the way physicists understand variance and invariance. We close by drawing connections to perspectivalism as well as other kinds of dependencies – such as gauge-dependence – in philosophy of physics.
Density functional theory (DFT) is one of the most popular frameworks through which quantum mechanics is ‘scaled up’ for the many-body modelling of molecules, solids, nuclei, and quantum fluids, yet it has received relatively little philosophical attention. By analyzing DFT’s central organizing structure – Jacob’s Ladder – I argue that DFT’s development presents a distinctive conceptual history of de-idealization. Rather than a linear reversal of idealizing assumptions, I characterize it as a spiral of de-idealization through re-idealization: de-idealizations aimed at reducing residual phenomena which succeed only in virtue of re-introducing new idealizations.
Field approaches to Bohmian quantum field theory face a Grassmann problem, since fermionic wave functionals prescribe Grassmann-valued amplitudes and field configurations which obstruct any natural interpretation of the fundamental ontology. By appealing to some recent advances concerning bosonization, I show how, at least in lattice field contexts, one can interpret any fermionic wave functional as an unproblematic bosonic one with an ordinary non-Grassmann-valued wave functional so long as we revise our understanding of the accompanying laws. Given bosonization, we can mow down the Grassmann problem for lattice field theories, removing one hurdle for field approaches to Bohmian quantum field theories.